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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Sixth Amendment-Systematic
Exclusion of Women from Jury Service Violates the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct. 692
(1975).
Appellant, a male, was convicted in a Louisiana state court of
aggravated kidnapping.' Prior to his trial, he had moved to quash
the petit jury venire on the ground that women had been systemati-
cally excluded from it. Under the Louisiana Constitution2 and crim-
inal procedure statutes,3 a woman could not be selected for jury
service unless she had filed a written declaration with the court
clerk of her desire to serve on a jury.4 The trial court denied appel-
1. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:44 (1974). The defendant was sentenced
to death but his motion in arrest of judgment attacking the death penalty
as cruel and unusual punishment was granted in accordance with the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972), and the trial court was instructed to impose a life sent-
ence. State v. Taylor, - La. -, 282 So.2d 491, 498 (1973).
2. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41 (1955) read as follows: "The Legislature
shall provide for the election and drawing of competent and intelligent
jurors for the trial of civil and criminal cases; provided, however, that no
woman shall be drawn for jury service unless she shall have previously filed
with the clerk of the District Court a written declaration of her desire to
be subject to such service." Effective January 1, 1975, this provision was
repealed. The Constitution now provides: "(A) A citizen of the state who
has reached the age of majority is elligible to serve as a juror within the
parish in which he is domiciled. The Legislature may provide additional
qualifications. (B) The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for exemption
of jurors." LA. CONST. art. V, § 33. (Special Pamphlet: The Const. of the
State of La. 1974, West 1974).
3. The Code provided: "A woman shall not be selected for jury service
unless she has previously filed with the clerk of court of the parish in which
she resides a written declaration of her desire to be subject to jury service."
LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 402 (1966). The provision has been repealed as
of January 1, 1975. All exemptions from jury service shall now be as pro-
vided by rules of the Louisiana Supreme Court pursuant to the State
Constitution. LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 403 (Supp. 1975).
4. At the time of appellant's challenge, Louisiana was the only state
which granted an automatic exemption to women. LA. CONST. art. VII, §
41 (1974); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 402 (1974). Florida and New Hamp-
shire had been the only other states to hold such provisions and such were
repealed in 1967. Fla. Laws 1967 ch. 67-154, § 1-2, amending FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 40.01(1) (1967); N.H. Laws 1967, § 100:1, modifying N.H. REV.
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lant's motion.5 The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed, deter-
mining that the statutory provisions were "neither irrational nor
discriminatory"' and thus did not violate either the Federal Consti-
tution or federal law.7 The United States Supreme Court reversed,
declaring the Louisiana jury selection procedure unconstitutional.'
STAT. ANN. § 500:1 (1968). Presently several states allow women in the jury
pool but grant them an exemption based solely on their sex. ALA. CODE tit.
33, § 21 (Supp. 1973) (for good cause shown); GA. CODE ANN. § 59-
112(6)(D) (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 494.031(2) (Supp. 1975) (before
jury sworn); R.I. GEN. LAWS. ANN. § 9-9-11 (1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-
108 (1955). The New York Legislature has recently repealed N.Y. JUDicIARY
LAW § 599(7) (McKinney 1968), which gave a statutory exemption based
solely on sex. It is now provided that all women must appear in person
before the court in order to claim an exemption. This action was taken in
'an attempt to comply with the Supreme Court decision in Taylor. 173
N.Y.L.J. 1, 3, cols. 1-2 (Feb. 11, 1975). Eleven other states allow an exemp-
tion from jury service where family responsibilities or care of children
under a certain age would interfere. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-218
(1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01(1) (1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 234, § 1
(1974) (exemption is given to parents or persons having custody of a child
under 15 years of age); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601.02 (1964); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:69-2(g) (Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 28 (Supp. 1974);
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 2135(2) (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-
10(14) (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-208.6(26) (Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-80 (1959).
5. - La. at - , 282 So. 2d at 497.
6. Id.
7. Id. at -, 282 So. 2d at 498. One justice dissented and argued that
the provisions violated the sixth and fourteenth amendments, citing Peters
v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
8. Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct. 692 (1975). A companion case, Healy
v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1973), was argued with Taylor
but an opinion has not yet been issued by the Court. 43 U.S.L.W. 3221
(U.S. Oct. 22, 1974). Healy was a civil case brought as a class action suit
which included three district groups: (1) all females in named Louisiana
parishes, (2) all males in named Louisiana parishes, (3) all female litigants
in pending civil state court cases. 363 F. Supp. at 1112. They sought a
declaration to have LA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 41 (1955) and statutes both civil
and criminal that granted an automatic exemption from jury service for
women declared unconstitutional. Both LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 402
(1966) (granting an automatic exemption from jury service for women in
criminal cases) and LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3055 (1968) (granting an
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The Court held that the presence of a fair cross section of the com-
munity is an essential requirement of an individual's right to jury
trial9 and that this right is contravened by the exclusion of women
from jury panels."'
Early common law juries were exclusively composed of males." It
was not until 1898 that this tradition was broken in the United
States when Utah became the first state to allow women to serve as
jurors. 2 Although many state statutes permit women to qualify for
jury service, they nevertheless grant them an automatic or qualified
exemption from such service.' 3 Statutes such as that challenged in
Taylor automatically excluded women from jury panels unless they
volunteered. 4
In upholding such statutes, courts have frequently relied upon the
Supreme Court's dictum in Strauder v. West Virginia:'5
automatic exemption from jury service for women in civil cases) were
identical in their language used to exempt women from service. The three
judge district court in Healy declared these provisions unconstitutional as
depriving litigants of due process of law and depriving female litigants of
the right to equal protection of the law. 363 F. Supp. at 1117. Taken
together Taylor and Healy placed the issue of the proper composition of
civil and criminal juries squarely before the Supreme Court. This Note will
only discuss cases which are concerned with the composition of criminal
juries.
9. 95 S. Ct. at 697; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
10. 95 S. Ct. at 699.
11. 3 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 352 (1775). A limited exception to
this rule allowed women to serve on a jury in cases where a woman pleaded
pregnancy in an action to exclude the next heir, id. at 362, or where a
woman under the sentence of death requested a stay of execution until her
child was born. 4 id. at 394. In each instance a jury of women was impa-
neled to try the question of whether the woman was pregnant.
12. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-8 (1953). Mississippi and South Carolina
became the last states in the Union to enact legislation granting women
the right to serve as jurors. Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (1972). See generally
Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U.L. REv.
723 (1935); Note, Twelve Good Persons and True: Healy and Taylor, 9
HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CV. Lm. L. REv. 561 (1974); Note, Jury Service for
Women, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 224 (1959).
13. See note 4 supra.
14. Id.
15. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Strauder, the first case of jury discrimination
1975]
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We do not say that within the limits from which it is not excluded by the
amendment a State may not prescribe the qualifications of its jurors, and in
so doing make discriminations. It may confine the selection to males, to
freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons having
educational qualifications."
Strauder presented the Court with its first opportunity to rule on
discrimination in jury selection. The Court held that a state statute
which limited jury service to whites violated the fourteenth amend-
ment.17 However, the Court characterized the fourteenth amend-
ment as protecting an individual only against discrimination by
race or color.' 8
Since Strauder, the majority of Supreme Court decisions have
considered challenges to jury selection systems designed to exclude
blacks. 9 The theory of the jury as a "cross section" of the com-
munity developed from these latter decisions. The Taylor Court has
now expressly determined that this theory is a fundamental aspect
heard by the Supreme Court, was one of three cases concerned with the
exclusion of blacks from juries. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880) (no
blacks on venire-challenge denied without more); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339 (1880) (judge charged with intentional exclusion of blacks from
jury list), see Tucker, Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection in Virginia,
52 Va. L. Rev. 736 (1966).
16. 100 U.S. at 310.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 310. In Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880) the principle
of Strauder was extended to cover not merely the statutory exclusion of
blacks from juries but also the discriminatory administration of ostensibly
fair jury selection laws to achieve the same result.
19. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (segregated tax returns);
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) (judges interviewed perspective
jurors); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (segregated jury tickets); Hill
v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) (jury commissioner's failure to seek out
blacks); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882) (blacks excluded by law);
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880) (blacks presumed to be incompetent
to serve as jurors); See also Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase,
41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 235 n.4 (1970). Since the first jury discrimination
cases the Supreme Court has considered only four cases regarding the
exclusion of women from juries. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Fay
v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187
(1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); see Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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of the sixth amendment right to jury and is.violated by the system-
atic exclusion of women."0
In Smith v. Texas,"1 petitioner, a black convicted of rape, asserted
that blacks were severely underrepresented on his and prior grand
juries2 because of intentional and systematic exclusion. In reversing
his conviction, the Court declared that a jury must be composed of
a cross section of the community: "It is part of the established
tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that
the jury be a body truly representative of the community." 3
Smith was followed by a series of cases challenging the composi-
tion of federal court grand and petit juries. 4 Glasser v. United
States was the first decision to apply the "cross section" concept
to the exclusion of women from juries:
20. 95 S. Ct. at 697-98.
21. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
22. The fifth amendment right to an indictment by a grand jury has
not been made applicable to the states as part of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
However, "[o]nce the State chooses to provide grand and petit juries,
whether or not constitutionally required to do so, it must hew to federal
constitutional criteria in ensuring that the selection of membership is free
of racial bias." Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The standards for selection are
essentially the same as those for a petit jury. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S.
354 (1939).
23. 311 U.S. at 130.
24. Congress had provided that jurors in federal court have the same
qualifications as those of the highest court of law of the state. Act of Mar.
3, 1911, ch. 231, § 275, 36 Stat. 1164. The federal code was revised in 1948
but still retained the provision disqualifying those incompetent to serve as
a grand or petit juror by the law of the state in which the district court is
held. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 951 (1948), as amended, 28
U.S.C. § 1861 (1970). By the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Congress entitled
women to sit on all federal juries even if they would be ineligible under
state law. Act of Sept. 9, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 152, 71 Stat 638, as
amended, 28 U.S.C. 1861 (1970).
25. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). Glasser was the first decision involving a chal-
lenge to a federal grand jury based on the exclusion of women from the
panel. The Court upheld the all male grand jury as being properly com-
posed but only because of the short period of time that had elapsed be-
tween the enactment of an Illinois statute granting women the right to
serve on a jury and the time of empaneling the grand jury. Id. at 65.
1975]
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[T]he jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury
be a 'body truly representative of the community,' and not the organ of any
special group or class . . . . Officials . . . must not allow the desire for
competent jurors to lead them into selections which do not comport with the
concept of the jury as a cross-section of the community.2
In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,27 the Supreme Court expressly
applied the "cross section" standards of Glasser. Petitioner alleged
that the federal jury commissioner had intentionally excluded daily
wage earners from the jury list; this created a majority representa-
tion of one class-businessmen. Noting that jury service is a duty
as well as a privilege,2s the Court continued:
The American tradition of trial by jury . . . necessarily contemplates an
impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. This does not
mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the eco-
nomic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the com-
munity; frequently such complete representation would be impossible. But
it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials with-
out systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups . . . . Jury
competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact
lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door
to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the demo-
cratic ideals of trial by jury.2'
The Court considered it immaterial that five members of the ex-
cluded laboring class served on the petit jury:3  "The evil lies in the
admitted wholesale exclusion of a large class of wage earners in
disregard of the high standards of jury selection."'"
26. Id. at 86.
27. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
28. Id. at 224. But see Penn v. Eubanks, 360 F. Supp. 699 (M.D. Ala.
1973); White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (both cases
holding jury service to be a right and obligation).
29. 328 U.S. at 220 (citation omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 225. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), was de-
cided in the term following Thiel, and held that women may not be ex-
cluded from federal grand juries which permitted them to serve. In consid-
ering women as a class the Court considered that "[T]he two sexes are
not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a
community composed of both. . . . To insulate the court room from either
may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct
quality is lost if either sex is excluded." Id. at 193-94. "The systematic and
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In Fay v. New York 31 there were a number of challenges to the
New York grand jury system, including the alleged systematic ex-
clusion of women from the venires. In affirming the lower court's
conclusion that appellant did not produce sufficient evidence sup-
porting his allegations, the Supreme Court implied that the exclu-
sion of women is not constitutionally significant. 3 Fay thus frus-
trated attempts to apply the "cross section" standard to state juries
and provided authority for later courts to ignore the exclusion or
underrepresentation of women.3 4
Hernandez v. Texas35 marked a distinct expansion of the rule
espoused in Strauder; it provided the basis for expanding the cover-
intentional exclusion of women, like the exclusion of a racial group or an
economic or social class deprives the jury system of the broad base it was
designed by Congress to have in our democratic society." Id. at 195 (cita-
tions omitted). But see United States v. Haynes, 69 F. Supp. 424 (W.D.
La. 1947).
32. 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
33. "It would. . . take something more than a judicial interpretation
to spell out of the Constitution a command to set aside verdicts rendered
by juries unleavened by feminine influence. The contention that women
should be on the jury is not based on the Constitution, it is based on a
changing view of the rights and responsibilities of women in our public life
... . [Wioman jury service has not so become a part of the textual or
customary law of the land that one convicted of a crime must be set free
by this Court if his state has lagged behind. . . in recognizing the rights
and obligations of womanhood. Id. at 289-90.
34. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); National Organization for
Women v. Goodman, 374 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Leighton v. Good-
man, 311 F. Supp. 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see Note, The Congress, the
Court and Jury Selection: A Critique of Titles I and II of the Civil Rights
Bill of 1966, 52 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1111 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Jury
Selection]. In 1953 the Supreme Court, in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953), again recognized the federal cross section theory while considering
the exclusion of blacks from jury venires, but hesitated to place all the
demands of that concept upon the states. The Court implied that there
may be a need for reasonable compliance: "Our duty to protect the federal
constitutional rights of all does not mean we must or should impose on
states our conception of the proper source of jury lists, so long as the source
reasonably reflects a cross-section of the population suitable in character
and intelligence for that civic duty." Id. at 474.
35. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
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age of the equal protection clause to all "cognizable"3 groups or
classes." Petitioner in Hernandez asserted that the exclusion of
Mexican-Americans from the grand and petit juries deprived him,
as a member of that class, of the equal protection of the laws as
guaranteed by the Constitution. In upholding petitioner's claim, the
Court asserted that the fourteenth amendment does not apply solely
to discrimination by race or color."
When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further
shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that class for differ-
ent treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of
the Constitution have been violated. The Fourteenth Amendment is not
directed solely against discrimination due to a 'two-class theory'-that is,
based upon differences between 'white' and Negro."
In terms of women's service to the community, the theme had
always been that "the woman's place is in the home." Such a posi-
tion was expressly asserted by the Supreme Court in Hoyt v.
36. For a determination of what constitutes a "cognizable" class or
group, see United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973);
Hopkins v. State, 19 Md. App. 414, 311 A.2d 483 (Md. Ct. of Spec. App.
1973).
37. Smith v. Yeager, 465 F.2d 272, 275 (3rd Cir. 1972) (all economic
classes); Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 727 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 991 (1967) (day laborers).
38. Hernandez used the traditional equal protection analysis of deter-
mining the reasonableness of the classification created by any acts or stat-
utes. Two standards have been developed by the courts to determine
whether a law that differentiates between distinct groups is violative of
equal protection. The first standard holds the law to be valid if the class
distinction is based on reasonable grounds and requires the complainant
to prove the distinction. See generally Eastwood, The Double Standard of
Justice; Women's Rights Under the Constitution, 5 VALPARISO L. REv. 281,
283 (1971); 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969). The second standard requires a
compelling state interest to uphold the law as against class distinctions.
The first standard has been applied to laws treating women as inferior or
in restricting their liberties. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); see
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). The second standard is stricter
and requires a compelling state interest with regard to situations of racial
classifications or those involving fundamental constitutional liberties. See,
e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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Florida," where the Court denied petitioner's challenge to a Florida
jury selection statute4' almost identical to that later declared uncon-
stitutional in Taylor. Relying on the language in Fay, the Hoyt
Court emphasized that the fourteenth amendment requires only
that a jury be "indiscriminately drawn from among those eligible
in the community for jury service, untrammelled by any arbitrary
and systematic exclusions."4 The Court recognized women43 as a
"cognizable" class. However, it found that the automatic exemption
granted to such class was based on a reasonable classification and
applied in a reasonable manner." The Court retreated to the "race
or color" rule of Strauder in finding that the statute was applied in
a reasonable manner:
This case in no way resembles those involving race or color in which the
circumstances shown were found by this Court to compel a conclusion of
purposeful discriminatory exclusions from jury service. There is present here
neither the unfortunate atmosphere of ethnic or racial prejudices which un-
derlay the situations depicted in those cases, nor the long course of discrimi-
natory administrative practice .... -1
Such reasoning appears to be infected with the idea of the woman
as "the center of home and family life."" The rationale is that there
can be no discrimination because it is not "constitutionally imper-
missible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to
conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury
service .
39. 347 U.S. at 478.
40. 368 U.S. 57 (1961). "Despite the enlightened emancipation of
women from the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their
entry into many parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved
to men, woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life." Id.
at 61-62. Hoyt has been expressly overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S.
Ct. at 701. See 36 TULANE L. REV. 858 (1962).
41. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01(1) (1959). "[Tlhe name of no female per-
son shall be taken for jury service unless said person has registered with
the clerk of the circuit court desire her to be placed on the jury list."
42. 368 U.S. at 59, citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284-85 (1900).
43. 368 U.S. at 60.
44. Id. at 61-62.
45. Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 62.
47. Id. The Court recognized that Florida is not alone in its philosophy,
1975]
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In a different view of women's rights, a three-judge federal court,
in what may be considered a precursor of Taylor, declared uncon-
stitutional an Alabama statute which absolutely barred women
from jury duty. 8 In White v. Crook9 the court logically reasoned:
Jury service is a form of participation in the processes of government, a
responsibility and a right that should be shared by all citizens, regardless of
sex .... The time must come when a state's complete exclusion of women
from jury service is recognized as so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be
unconstitutional.6A
Although White is not based on the same facts as Hoyt,"1 it repre-
sents the first holding that the absolute exclusion of women by the
operation of a state statute violates the equal protection clause.5"
The only states with exclusion statutes identical to those in White
as seventeen other states and the District of Columbia granted an absolute
exemption based solely on sex. Id. n.6. Further, three states do not allow
women the right to serve as a juror. Id. n.5. See also note 13 supra.
48. ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 21 (Supp. 1957), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
49. 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966). Contra, Williams v. South
Carolina, 237 F. Supp. 360, 370-71 (E.D.S.C. 1965) (exclusion of women
not unconstitutional); State v. Hall, - Miss. - , 187 So. 2d 861,
appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 98 (1966) (rejecting the reasoning of White and
holding such absolute exclusion to be constitutional in the interest of con-
tinuing a woman's services as a mother, wife and/or homemaker).
50. 251 F. Supp. at 408-09.
51. __ Miss. __, 187 So. 2d at 870 (Ethridge, C.J., dissenting). The
crucial distinction between White and Hoyt in a factual context was that
White involved a challenge to an Alabama statute that totally excluded
women from any form of jury service. In Hoyt a Florida statute did not
exclude women from jury service but only gave them an automatic exemp-
tion from such service. See notes 40 & 47 supra.
52. Congressional legislation concerning the exclusion of women also
reached its culmination at this time with the enactment of the Jury Selec-
tion and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1970). With regard to
federal juries the Act declared: "It is the policy of the United States that
all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right
to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the
community in the district or division wherein the court convenes." 28
U.S.C. 1861 (1970). With regard to women the Act declared that "No
citizen shall be excluded from service . . . on account of. . . sex ... "
Id. § 1862.
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subsequently repealed them.5 3 Nevertheless several states, by means
of the jury selection methods employed in the local courts, contin-
ued to include only token numbers of women in their venires.5 4
Lower federal courts, asserting that the aim of the law is to obtain
jurors truly representing a "cross section" of the community, re-
sponded unfavorably.55
The Supreme Court, in Duncan v. Louisiana,5" made the sixth
amendment right to a trial by jury57 applicable to the states." It
found that the purpose of a jury was to prevent oppression by the
government. Affirming this purpose the Court, in Williams v.
Florida,59 reasoned:
[The] essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between
the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of
laymen, and in the community participation .... To be sure, the number
should probably be large enough to promote group deliberation, free from
outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for obtain-
ing a representative cross section of the community. 0
53. See note 11 supra.
54. Ford v. White, 430 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1970). A companion case was
decided concurrently, Raiford v. Dillon, 430 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1970). See
also United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir 1970).
55. See note 34 supra. Such cases were decided with implied reference
to decisions concerning tokenism and the black. "Token systematic inclu-
sion of Negroes is only a facet of the overall problem of systematic exclu-
sion; both are condemned by Federal and State cases." Billingsley v. Clay-
ton, 359 F.2d 13, 17 (5th Cir. 1966). See also Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950) (17 blacks served in 6 years); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354
(1939) (one black within memory).
56. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
57.- "Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his
peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." Id. at
156.
58. But it is permissible with the Supreme Court's principle of federal-
ism that the states should be permitted greater latitude in fashioning their
jury selection procedures. The result, however, must be suitable to produce
a representative cross-section of the community. 344 U.S. at 474; see
Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970).
59. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
60. Id. at 100. See also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972)
asserting the importance of a "group of laymen representative of a cross
section of the community."
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Taylor concluded that the sixth amendment right to a jury re-
quires a jury composed of a "cross section" of the community.'
Specifically, it held unconstitutional a statute automatically ex-
empting women from venires.6" In considering whether a rational
basis existed to exempt women from jury service, the Court in
Taylor noted the changing status of women from the time of Hoyt
to the present.63 The Court pointed out that "the unmistakable
import of this Court's opinions, at least since 1941 . . . is that the
selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the
community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial."" The Court further reasoned" that if "the fair
61. 95 S. Ct. at 697.
62. Id. at 701; see notes 2 & 3 supra. The Supreme Court has never
ruled on the constitutionality of statutes absolutely exlcuding women from
juries, and no such statutes currently exist. The Taylor reasoning clearly
indicates that such statutes are also unconstitutional. 95 S. Ct. at 700.
63. The Supreme Court, while declaring unconstitutional the jury ex-
emption statutes of Louisiana, relied on a strong fundamental rights analy-
sis but also utilized a statistical analysis to overrule the social justification
for a woman's exemption from jury service. In Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S.
62 (1968) the state had argued that state interest was based on the assump-
tion that the "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family
life" along with a consideration of administrative convenience. Id. at 62-
63. Louisiana relied on this argument in upholding it's exemption statutes
as constitutional. State v. Taylor, La. -, 282 So.2d at 497. The
Supreme Court in Taylor acknowledged the statistics compiled by the
Department of Labor with regard to the percentage of women participating
in today's modern work force. 95 S. Ct. at 700 n.17. The Court reasoned
that although "these statistics perhaps speak more to the evolving nature
of the structure of the family unit in American society than to the nature
of the role played by women who happen to be members of a family unit,
they certainly put to rest the suggestion that all women should be exempt
from jury service based solely on their sex and the presumed role in the
home." Id.; see Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 43 U.S.L.W. 4398, 4396 n.l
(U.S. Mar. 19, 1975).
64. 95 S. Ct. at 697.
65. The Taylor Court relied on Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187
(1946), as authority for the distinctiveness between the male and female
sexes. See note 30 supra. See also Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110
(E.D. La. 1973). "[Females'] absence from jury panels is significant not
because all women act alike, but because they contribute a distinctive
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cross-section rule is to govern the selection of juries, as we have
concluded it must, women cannot be systematically excluded from
jury panels from which petit juries are drawn." 6 The Court con-
medley of views influenced by differences in biology, cultural impact and
life experience, indespensable if the jury is to comprise a cross-section of
the community." Id. at 1115.
66. 95 S. Ct. at 699. Whether the exclusion of women from venires
violates the sixth amendment cross-section requirement was not before the
Court for the first time in Taylor. The issue had been challenged in Alexan-
der v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), but the Court decided the case on
other grounds. In Alexander, petitioner, a black, challenged the grand jury
selection procedures as discriminatory against blacks, and also against
women, because of the Louisiana statutory exemptions. Justice Douglas,
while admonishing the Court for not deciding the challenge to the exclu-
sion of women, id. at 634, considered the issue in a concurring opinion, and
reached the same conclusion as the majority in Taylor. Justice Douglas
concluded that Hoyt must be overruled. He rejected the rationale of Hoyt
primarily by a statistical analysis, id. at 639, of the circumstances of the
cases in conjunction with a social view of the woman's role in society today.
Id. at 641-44. That a "woman's place is in the home," or that a woman is
by "her nature" ill suited for a particular task, are no longer sufficient as
a legislative purpose in exempting women from service, and such being
"[c]lassifications based on sex are no longer insulated from judicial scru-
tiny . . . ." Id. at 641. See Abbott v. Mines, 411 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969),
holding that "[i]t is common knowledge that society no longer coddles
women from the very real and sometimes brutal facts of life." Id. at 355.
The Louisiana absolute exemption for women had been held unconstitu-
tional by a lower federal court in Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110
(E.D. La. 1973). While expressly overruling Hoyt, id. at 1117, the court
relied upon Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), as a basis of woman's rights under the equal
protection clause. Reed invalidated an Idaho statute which gave preference
as estate administrators to males. The Court concluded that by ignoring
the individual qualifications of particular applicants, the challenged stat-
ute provided a "dissimiliar treatment for men and women who are . . .
similarly situated," id. at 77, and thus violated the equal protection
clause. Significantly, the Court directed it's scrutiny toward the general
purpose of the legislation-reducing the administrative workload-and not
toward the purpose of the classification itself as had the Court in Hoyt.
Id. at 76-77. In Frontiero, there was a challenge to statutes that considered
spouses of servicemen automatically to be dependents while spouses of
servicewomen must prove dependence for more than one half of their sup-
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cluded that because of Duncan, the right of women to sit on state
juries is a fundamental right which "cannot be overcome on merely
rational grounds. There must be weightier reasons if a distinctive
class representing 53% of the eligible jurors is for all practical pur-
poses to be excluded from jury service." 7
Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, was primarily concerned
with reversing a conviction without a showing of prejudice in the
manner the jury was selected. 8 However, he ignored the recent Su-
preme Court decision in Peters v. Kiff. 9
In Peters,"7 aowhite defendant challenged the exclusion of blacks
port. Four Justices declared that sex was a "suspect classification" under
the equal protection clause, 411 U.S. at 692, arguing that a classification
based on sex should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and states
should prove a compelling state interest to uphold the statutes.
67. 95 S. Ct. at 699-700.
68. Id. at 702 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. 407 U.S. 493 (1972). Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun joined in
the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 507-13. In consider-
ing the exclusions from juries because of race, the dissenters viewed the
real issue to be that such illegallity does not necessarily void a criminal
conviction absent any demonstration of prejudice. Justice Rehnquist was
the sole dissenter in Taylor. Justice Rehnquist also questioned whether
the right to a jury composed of a fair cross-section of the community is a
"fundamental" right under Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). He
utilized Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) and Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972), as authority that the test of a "fundamental" right
is a "sturdy test, one not readily satisfied by every discrepancy between
federal and state practice." 95 S. Ct. at 703. Yet he fails to recognize that
both cases imply that the right to a jury composed of a fair cross section
of the community is applicable to the states under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
70. 407 U.S. 493 (1972). The decision of Peters laid to rest the same
class rule which had pervaded the state and lower federal courts since
Strauder. Such rule did not allow a person with regard to the selection of
a jury to claim discrimination against a race or class of which he is not a
member without showing actual prejudice. Salisbury v. Grimes, 406 F.2d
50 (5th Cir. 1969) (a white may not challenge the exclusion of a black);
Woodruff v. Breazeale, 291 F. Supp. 130 (N.D. Miss. 1967), affd, 401 F.2d
997 (5th Cir. 1968); Haraway v. State, 203 Ark. 912, 159 S.W.2d 733 (1942)
(black cannot complain of absence of white); cf. State v. Koritz, 227 N.C.
552, 43 S.E.2d 77, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 768 (1947), and State v. Brunson,
[Vol. IIn
CASE NOTES
from the jury.7 The Court held that "a criminal dependant has
standing to challenge the system used to select his grand or petit
jury, on the ground that it arbitrarily excludes from service the
members of any race, and thereby denies him due process of law."7
The Peters Court further stated:
[E]xclusion from jury service of a substantial and identifiable class of citi-
zens has a potential impact that is too subtle and too pervasive to admit of
confinement to particular issues or particular cases .... It is in the nature
of the practices here challenged that proof of actual harm, or lack of harm,
is virtually impossible to adduce. . . . In light of the great potential for harm
latent in an unconstitutional jury-selection system. . . any doubt should be
resolved in favor of giving the opportunity for challenging the jury to too
many defendants, rather than giving it to too few.' 3
Although it is impossible to determine what a jury under a proper
selection system would decide, the state must suffer the conse-
quences .
The ramifications of Taylor have already been felt in New York.
Prior to Taylor, a New York statute exempted women from jury
service solely because of their sex."5 This statute had repeatedly
been upheld as constitutional." The New York statute required a
227 N.C. 558, 43 S.E.2d 82 (1947), rev'd, 333 U.S. 851 (1948). These com-
panion cases both charged that blacks were excluded from the jury selec-
tion. Koritz was white while Brunson was black. The denial of certiorari
of Koritz could be reasoned as a cause of the same class rule. But cf.
Mayfield v. Steed, 345 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 691
(8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
71. Petitioner's challenge' involved a pre-Duncan jury challenge. At
that time there was no right to a trial by jury under the sixth amendment.
407 U.S. at 500.
72. Id. at 504.
73. Id. at 503-04; accord Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. at 299 (Murphy,
J., dissenting).
74. 407 U.S. at 504. See Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958). "A
prisoner whose conviction is reversed by this Court need not go free if he
is in fact guilty, for [the State] may indict and try him again by the
procedure which conforms to the constitutional requirements. But no State
is at liberty to impose upon one charged with a crime a discrimination in
its trial procedure which the Constitution, and an Act of Congress ...
forbid." Id. at 589, quoting Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942).
75. N.Y. JDIciARY LAW § 599(7) (McKinney 1968).
76. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); United States v. Caci, 401
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woman to affirmatively claim her exemption; in Louisiana, the
exemption was automatic. Any woman who wished to serve on a
New York jury was required to file a declaration to that effect with
the clerk of the court.77
In light of Taylor,18 one New York state court found that the New
York exemption statute was unconstitutional because it caused an
underrepresentation of women on juries.79 The New York Legis-
lature then amended its exemption laws to coincide with Taylor,
striking women from the list of those expressly exempted. 0 Today,
all women in New York are required to appear in person when called
for jury service.8' They will only be exempted on the authority of a
judge who may excuse or postpone jury service upon personal or
written application." This legislative action may serve as a model
for similar changes in the five states still granting an exemption
from jury service based solely on sex."
Kenneth J. Mulvey Jr.
F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1968); National Org. for Women v. Goodman, 374 F.
Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
77. See notes 2 and 3 supra.
78. The Court, in Taylor, was careful to emphasize that its decision
does not infringe on the rights of states to exempt individuals in an occupa-
tion critical to the public welfare or in cases of hardship or incapacity. 95
S. Ct. at 701-02. The Court reaffirms this position by citing its decisions
in Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1952); Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906).
79. People v. Moss, 173 N.Y.L.J. 19, col. 3 (County Ct. Feb. 4, 1975).
Moss declared the operation of the N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 599(7) (McKin-
ney 1968) to be unconstitutional as it prevents a panel of jurors from
fairly representing a cross section of the community. The court documents
its findings with a series of statistical charts considering the makeup ofjuries in Kings County over the past five and one-half years, which deli-
neate the substantial underrepresentation of women on the jury panels.
Contra, People v. Moore, 173 N.Y.L.J. 18, col. 2 (County Ct. Feb. 5, 1975);
People v. Tabb, 173 N.Y.L.J. 16, col. 1 (County Ct. Feb. 5, 1975); People
v. Hunn, 173 N.Y.L.J. 17, col. 8 (County Ct. Feb. 5, 1975).
80. N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 4, § 00 (McKinney 1975).
81. Id. See also 173 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 1975, at 1, col. 1-2.
82. N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 4, § 00 (McKinney 1975).
83. See note 9 supra.
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